Mobility clause: validity and termination in case of refusal to be seconded
In a ruling dated September 2, 2025, the Brussels Labor Court clarified the validity of a mobility clause and confirmed that the dismissal of the employee who refused the secondment is not manifestly unreasonable.
Facts
The employment contract contains a broad mobility clause. This clause expressly states that “the employee hereby agrees to accept any assignment or transfer on behalf of the employer or an affiliated company, both in Belgium and abroad.”
The employer decides to temporarily assign the employee to Italy for a position corresponding to her skills. The employee does not respond to the employer’s requests, becomes unable to work for several months, and ultimately explicitly refuses this assignment.
The question arises as to whether the dismissal of this employee is manifestly unreasonable within the meaning of CBA No. 109.
Decision of the Labor Court
The Court held that:
- The mobility clause is valid since the very purpose of this clause is to treat the place of work as a non-essential element of the contract and to obtain the employee’s prior consent regarding assignments or transfers abroad. The employee consented to this by signing the employment contract;
- The employee’s refusal concerns the very principle of the secondment. Given the mobility clause in the contract, this refusal is not legitimate.
The Court therefore rules that the grounds for dismissal are based on the employee’s conduct and that the termination constitutes a reasonable management decision in response to a refusal to perform a contractually mandated assignment.
The claim for compensation based on CBA No. 109 is dismissed.
Takeaway
A mobility clause is valid to the extent that it reflects the employee’s prior consent and renders the workplace non-essential.
If the employee is not compelled to accept the mobility, refusal to comply with a contractual obligation reasonably justifies the termination of their employment contract.
Source: Brussels Labor Court (4th Chamber), September 2, 2025, Case No. 2021/AB/700.